Introduction
The use of convolutional neural networks has led to tremendous achievements since Krizhevsky et al. [1] presented AlexNet in 2012. Despite efforts to understand the inner workings of such neural networks, they mostly remain black boxes that are hard to interpret or explain. The issue was exaggerated in 2013 when Szegedy et al. [2] showed that "adversarial examples" -images perturbed in such a way that they fool a neural network -prove that neural networks do not simply work correctly the way one might naïvely expect. Typically, such adversarial attacks change an input only slightly, but in an adversarial manner, such that humans would not regard the difference of the inputs relevant, but machines do. There are various types of attacks, such as one pixel attacks, attacks that work in the physical world, and attacks that produce inputs fooling several different neural networks without explicit knowledge of those networks [3, 4, 5] . Even though a number of defense mechanisms have been proposed, no universal defense mechanism can prevent adversarial attacks yet, and it is debated whether the possibility of such attacks is inherent in high-dimensional learning problems [6] .
Adversarial attacks are not strictly limited to convolutional neural networks. Even the simplest binary classifier partitions the entire input space into labeled regions, and where there are no training samples close by, the respective label can only be nonsensical with regards to the training data, in particular near decision boundaries. The "problem" that convolutional neural networks have is that they perform extraordinarily well in high-dimensional settings, where the training data only cover a very thin manifold, leaving a lot of "empty space" with ragged class regions. This creates a lot of room for an attacker to modify an input sample and move it away from the manifold on which the network can make meaningful predictions, into regions with nonsensical labels. Due to this, even adversarial attacks that simply blur an image, without any specific target, can be successful [6] . Strictly speaking, it is not entirely clear what defines an adversarial example as opposed to an incorrectly classified sample. Adversarial attacks are devised such that they change inputs only minimally while leading to incorrect classifications -this typically leads to surprising examples, since humans and machine process and understand them differently and so react differently to them. Adversarial examples are typically not constructed to fool humans. There exist astonishing parallels between human visual information processing and deep learning as highlighted e. g. by Yamins and DiCarlo [7] and Rajalingham et al. [8] . Recently, experimental evidence has indicated that specific types of adversarial attacks can be constructed that also deteriorate the decisions of humans, when they are allowed only limited time for their decision making [9] . Still, human vision relies on a number of fundamentally different principals when compared to deep neural networks: while machines process image information in parallel, humans actively explore scenes via saccadic moves, displaying unrivaled abilities for structure perception and grouping in visual scenes as formalized e. g. in the form of the Gestalt laws [10, 11, 12] . As a consequence, some attacks are perceptible by humans, as displayed in Figure 1 . Here, humans can detect a clear difference between the original image and the modified one; in particular in very homogeneous regions, attacks lead to structures and patterns which a human observer can recognize. We propose a simple method to address this issue and answer the following questions. How can we attack images using standard attack strategies, such that a human observer does not recognize a clear difference between the modified image and the original? How can we make use of the fundamentals of human visual perception to "hide" attacks such that an observer does not notice the changes?
Several different strategies when performing adversarial attacks exist. For a multiclass classifier, the attack's objective can be to have the classifier predict any label other than the correct one, in which case the attack is referred to as untargeted, or some specifically chosen label, in which case the attack is called targeted. The former corresponds to minimizing the likelihood of the original label being assigned; the latter to maximizing that of the target label. Moreover, the classifier can be fooled into classifying the modified input with extremely high confidence, depending on the method employed. This, in particular, can however lead to visible artifacts in the resulting images (see Figure 1 ). After looking at a number of examples, one can quickly learn to make out typical patterns that depend on the classifying neural network. In this work, we propose a method for changing this procedure such that this effect is avoided.
For this purpose, we extend known techniques for adversarial attacks. A particularly simple and fast method for attacking convolutional neural networks is the aptly named Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) [13, 4] . This method, in its original form, modifies an input image x along a linear approximation of the objective of the network. It is fast but limited to untargeted attacks. An extension [14] of FGSM repeatedly adds small perturbations and allows targeted attacks. We refer to it as the Targeted Iterative Fast Gradient Sign Method (TIFGSM). Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. [15] linearize the classifier and compute smaller (with regards to the p norm) perturbations that result in untargeted attacks. Using more computationally demanding optimizations, Carlini and Wagner [16] minimize the 0 , 2 , or ∞ norm of a perturbation to achieve targeted attacks that are still harder to detect. Su et al. [3] carry out attacks that change only a single pixel, but these attacks are only possible for some input images and target labels. Further methods exist that do not result in obvious artifacts, e. g. the Contrast Reduction Attack [17] , but these are again limited to untargeted attacks -the input images are merely corrupted such that the classification changes. None of the methods mentioned here regard human perception directly, even though they all strive to find imperceptibly small perturbations.
Schönherr et al. [18] succesfully do this within the domain of acoustics.
We rely on TIFGSM as the method of choice for attacks based on images, because it allows robust targeted attacks with results that are classified with arbitrarily high certainty, even though it is easy to implement and efficient to execute. Its drawbacks are the aforementioned visible artifacts. To remedy this issue, we will take a step back and consider human perception directly as part of the attack. In this work, we propose a straightforward, very effective modification to TIFGSM that ensures targeted attacks are visually imperceptible, based on the observation that attacks do not need to be applied homogeneously across the input image and that humans struggle to notice artifacts in image regions of high local complexity. We hypothesize that such attacks, in particular, do not change saccades as severely as generic attacks, and so humans perceive the original image and the modified one as similar -this hypothesis will be evaluated in future work, with our current contribution focusing on the algorithmic fundamentals of our proposed method.
Adversarial attacks
Recall the objective of a targeted adversarial attack. Given a classifying convolutional neural network f , we want to modify an input x, such that the network assigns a different label f (x ) to the modified input x than to the original x, where the target label f (x ) can be chosen at will. At the same time, x should be as similar to x as possible, i. e. we want the modification to be small. This results in the optimization problem:
where y = f (x ) is the target label of the attack. TIFGSM finds such a small perturbation x − x by iteratively adapting the input according to the update rule
until f assigns the label y to the modified input with the desired certainty, where the certainty is typically computed via the softmax over the activations of all class-wise outputs. sign[∇ x J(x, y)] denotes the sign of the gradient of the objective function J(x, y), and is computed efficiently via backpropagation; is the step size. The norm of the perturbation is not considered explicitly.
Localized attacks
The main technical observation, based on which we hide attacks, is the fact that one can weigh and apply attacks locally in a precise sense: During prediction, a convolutional neural network extracts features from an input image, condenses the information contained therein, and conflates it, in order to obtain its best guess for classification. Where exactly in an image a certain feature is located is of minor consequence compared to how strongly it is expressed [19] . As a result, we find that during TIFGSM, it is not strictly necessary to apply the computed perturbation evenly across the entire image. Instead, one may choose to leave parts of the image unchanged, or perturb some pixels more or less than others, i. e. one may localize the attack. This can be directly incorporated into Equation (2) brightness of a pixel corresponds to how strongly the respective pixel in the input image is modified. The adaptation rule (2) of TIFGSM is changed to the update rule
for all pixel values (i, j, k). In order to be able to express the overall strength of an attack, for a given strength map E of size w by h, we call
the relative total strength of E, where for n ∈ N we let n = {1, . . . , n} denote the set of natural numbers from 1 to n. In the special case where E only contains either black or white pixels, κ(E) is the ratio of white pixels, i. e. the number of attacked pixels over the total number of pixels in the attacked image. As long as the scope of the attack, i. e. κ(E), remains large enough, adversarial attacks can still be carried out successfully -if not as easily -with more iterations required until the desired certainty is reached. This leads to the attacked pixels being perturbed more, which in turn leads to even more pronounced artifacts. Given a strength map E, it can be modified to increase or decrease κ(E) by adjusting its brightness or by applying appropriate morphological operations. See Figure 2 for a demonstration that uses pseudo-random noise as a strength map.
Entropy-based attacks
The crucial component necessary for "hiding" adversarial attacks is choosing a strength map E that appropriately considers human perceptual biases. The strength map essentially determines which "norm" is chosen in Equation (1). If it differs from a uniform weighting, the norm considers different regions of the image differently. The choice of the norm is critical when discussing the visibility of adversarial attacks. Methods that explicitly minimize the p norm of the perturbation for some p, only "accidentally" lead to perturbations that are hard to detect visually, since the p norm does not actually resemble e. g. the human visual focus for the specific image. We propose to instead make use of how humans perceive images and to carefully choose those pixels where the resulting artifacts will not be noticeable.
Instead of trying to hide our attack in the background or "where an observer might not care to look", we instead focus on those regions where there is high local complexity. This choice is based on the rational that humans inspect images in saccadic moves, and a focus mechanism guides how a human can process highly complex natural scenes efficiently in a limited amount of time. Visual interest serves as a selection mechanism, singling out relevant details and arriving at an optimized representation of the given stimuli [20] . We rely on the assumption that adversarial attacks remain hidden if they do not change this scheme. In particular, regions which do not attract focus in the original image should not increase their level of interest, while relevant parts can, as long as the adversarial attack is not adding additional relevant details to the original image.
Due to its dependence on semantics, it is hard -if not impossible -to agnostically compute the magnitude of interest for specific regions of an image. Hence, we rely on a simple information theoretic proxy, which can be computed based on the visual information in a given image: the entropy in a local region. This simplification relies on the observation that regions of interest such as edges typically have a higher entropy than homogeneous regions and the entropy serves as a measure for how much information is already contained in a region -that is, how much relative difference would be induced by additional changes in the region.
Algorithmically, we compute the local entropy at every pixel in the input image as follows: After discarding color, we bin the gray values, i. e. the intensities, in the neighborhood of pixel a i, j such that B i,j contains the respective occurrence ratios. The occurence rations can be interpreted as estimates of the intensity probability in this neighborhood, hence the local entropy S i,j can be calculated as the Shannon entropy
Through this, we obtain a measure of local complexity for every pixel in the input image, and after adjusting the overall intensity, we use it as suggested above to scale the perturbation pixel-wise during TIFGSM's update. In other words, we set
where φ is a nonlinear mapping, which adjusts the brightness. The choice of a strength map based on the local entropy of an image allows us to perform an attack as straightfor-ward as TIFGSM, but localized, in such a way that it does not produce visible artifacts, as we will see in the following experiments.
Experiments
We perform classical TIFGSM and our entropy-based method in order to compare the resulting images. We attack two different convolutional neural networks, Inception v3 [21] and AlexNet [1] , with a number of different input images. Both networks were trained on ImageNet -we use the architectures and weights as provided by torchvision. In every attack, the target label is slug, chosen quasi-arbitrarily because it is a simple, well known class, and does not occur in any of our input images. To calculate local entropy maps, gray values are binned in a circular neighborhood with a radius of three pixels. Then, we use histogram equalization to spread the intensity between zero and one, and finally take every value to the power of four in order to reduce the relative total strength, giving us the nonlinear transformation Φ (cf. Equation (6)). As a first example, we demonstrate the effect of different adversarial attacks for one important application domain, where relevant parts of images are comparably simple: traffic sign recognition. Convolutional neural networks are employed to recognize traffic signs [22] . We demonstrate an attack with a photo of a traffic sign as input ( Figure 4 ). The perturbation when the attack is based on entropy is much less visible when compared to a classic TIFGSM attack. As an extreme setting, with a particularly difficult attack, we also show the results when using a rasterized digital version of the same street sign ( Figure 5 ). In both cases, the classifying network is Inception v3. In this case, both types of attacks are visible, due to the extreme setting, but much less so for the entropy-based attack -more importantly, the entropy-based attack leads to mild artifacts that might be taken for compression artifacts, as opposed to signalling an adversarial attack.
A similar behavior can be observed for a wide range of images, as displayed in Figures 6  and 7 for Inception v3 and Figures 8 and 9 for AlexNet. So far, our evaluation is based on subjective visual impression. We will substantiate this conjecture with experimental user studies to quantify the effectiveness of the method to stay hidden for human inspection.
From an algorithmic point of view, we can evaluate the efficiency of the method by the number of iterations needed to perform an adversarial attack. We look at how many iterations it takes to achieve classification certainty above 99 % and relate it to the relative total strength computed from the image. For this, we attack Inception v3 on 55 inputs and present the results in Figure 3 . There is no clear correlation of the required number of iterations and the relative total strength, which is to be expected since the local shape of the classifier at the individual samples plays a crucial role in the complexity of an attack. All our entropy-based attacks succeed with all considered samples.
Discussion
We have demonstrated two key points:
1. Attacks against convolutional neural networks can be successful even when they are localized.
2. By reasoning about how humans perceive images and carefully choosing areas of high complexity for an attack, we can ensure that the applied perturbation is imperceptible, even to an astute observer who has learned to recognize typical patterns found in adversarial examples. Our method robustly attacks different convolutional neural networks and even performs well in a difficult artificial case. As already mentioned, a quantitative evaluation of the efficiency of the techniques as regards their invisibility for humans is subject of ongoing research. 
